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Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its
victims may be the most oppressive .... [T]hose who torment us
for our own good will torment us without end for they do so with
the approval of their own conscience.1
Introduction
To be a child is to be at risk, dependent, and without capacity or
authority to decide what is "best" for oneself.
To be an adult is to be a risktaker, independent, and with capacity
and authority to decide and to do what is "best" for oneself.
To be an adult who is a parent is to be presumed in law to have the
capacity, authority, and responsibility to determine and to do what is
good for one's children.
The law is designed to assure for each child an opportunity to meet
and master the developmental crises on the way to adulthood-to that
critical age when he or she is presumed by the state to be qualified to
determine what is "best" for oneself.-' As Jeremy Bentham observed
not so long ago in 1840:
The feebleness of infancy demands a continual protection.
Everything must be done for an imperfect being, which as yet
does nothing for itself. The complete development of its physical
powers takes many years; that of its intellectual faculties is still
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slower. At a certain age, it has already strength and passions, with-
out experience enough to regulate them. Too sensitive to present
impulses, too negligent of the future, such a being must be kept
under an authority more immediate than that of the laws .... 3
That "more immediate" authority is parental authority. Thus,
society's law, in accord with nature's law, seeks to assure for each child
permanent membership in a family with at least one and preferably
two caretaking adults. 4 The law, reflecting Bentham's view, has a
strong presumption in favor of parental authority free of coercive in-
trusion by agents of the state.5 Indeed, it is a function of law to protect
3. 1 J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 248 (Boston 1840). Similarly, Freud observed:
The biological factor is the long period of time during which the young of the
human species is in a condition of helplessness and dependence. Its intra-uterine
existence seems to be short in comparison with that of most animals, and it is sent
into the world in a less finished state . . . . Moreover, the dangers of the external
world have a greater importance for it, so that the value of the object which can
alone protect it against them and take the place of its former intra-uterine life is
enormously enhanced. This biological factor, then, establishes the earliest situations
of danger and creates the need to be loved whiclf will accompany the child through
the rest of its life.
S. FREUD, INHIBITIONS, SYMPTOMS, AND ANXIETIES 139-40 (1926) (emphasis added).
4. See generally J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS Or THE
CHILD (1973) [hereinafter cited as BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS].
5. The extent to which parental authority is protected by the Constitution is not of
primary concern in this essay. Yet it should not go unrecognized that the Supreme Court
has established that the Fourteenth Amendment protects, as a liberty interest, the very
nature of family life. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)
(mandatory maternity leave for teachers denial of due process); United States v. Orito,
413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973) (constitutional right of privacy includes right of marriage, pro-
creation, motherhood, child rearing, and education); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53
(1972) (right of privacy, founded in Fourteenth Amendment's concept of liberty, extends
to child rearing and education); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230-35 (1972) (parental
right to direct religious education of child); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)
(presumption that unwed father unfit to keep his children violates due process and
equal protection); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (constitutional
protection for marital privacy); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)
("liberty" of parents to direct education of their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 400-03 (1923) ("liberty" of parents to raise children). Under these cases, that interest
extends from the very decision to conceive children and initiate a family to the right to
direct a child's upbringing.
The traditional protection of the family relationship from state intrusion is also
acknowledged in tort law by a general rule of reciprocal immunity for both parents and
their minor children from liability for personal torts committed by them on one another,
as well as a specific parental exemption for disciplinary efforts which otherwise would
be perceived as intentional torts on these minor children. AV. PRossR, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 27, at 136-38 (4th ed. 1971) (citing cases both upholding immunity
and rejecting immunity); see also J. GOLDSTEIN & J. KATZ, THE FAMILY AND THE LAw 399-
408 (1965); IV. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 140-42,
639-51 (6th ed. 1976). Sdch immunity is further reenforced by penal statutes like the
following from New York:
The use of physical force upon another person which would otherwise constitute
an offense is justifiable and not criminal under any of the following circumstances:
1. A parent, guardian or other person entrusted with the care and supervision of
a minor or an incompetent person, and a teacher or other person entrusted with the
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family privacy as a means of safeguarding parental autonomy in child
rearing.6 At the same time the law attempts to safeguard each child's
entitlement to autonomous parents who care and who feel responsible
and who can be held accountable for continually meeting the child's
ever-changing physical and psychological needs.
Like all authority, however, parental authority may be abused.
Family privacy may become a cover for exploiting the inherent in-
equality between adult and child.7 Thus children who, by definition,
are both physically and psychologically at risk may sometimes be
placed at further risk by the adult "caretakers" who are presumed to
be essential to their well-being.
This essay explores the role for law in protecting children from
parental exploitation and parents and children within a family from
state exploitation in the provision or denial of medical care. The goal
is to determine the extent to which the law should supervene, not only
the right and obligation of parents to decide what medical attention
should or should not be provided for their children, but also the
reciprocal right of children to have their parents assume responsibility
for making such decisions.8 This quest incorporates two questions
about empowering the state to breach its commitment to family privacy
and to parental autonomy: (1) What circumstances, if any, should
constitute probable cause for the state to intrude on family privacy by
investigating parental decisions about a child's health and medical
care and supervision of a minor for a special purpose, may use physical force, but
not deadly physical force, upon such minor or incompetent person when and to the
extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to maintain discipline or to promote
the welfare of such minor or incompetent person.
N.Y. PENAL LAw § 35.10 (McKinney 1967). A similar provision is contained in the Model
Penal Code § 3.07(1).
6. This notion is not unlike what Chafee said of the First Amendment: "It] and
other parts of the law erect a fence inside which men can talk. The law-makers, legis-
lators and officials stay on the outside of that fence." Z. CHAFEE, THE BLEsSINGs OF
LmrRT 108 (1956). Together, privacy and autonomy give content to another concept,
"family integrity," which was explicitly recognized by the Court in Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 651 (1972), and which is to be found in Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ull-
man, 367 U.S. 497, 551-52 (1961) ("The home derives its pre-eminence as the seat of
family life. And the integrity of that life is something so fundamental that it has been
found to draw to its protection the principles of more than one explicitly granted
Constitutional right.") See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan,
J., concurring) (relying upon his dissent in Poe).
7. See Erikson, Growth and Crises of the "Healthy Personality," in PERSONALITY IN
NATURE, SocITm', AND CULTURE 185 (2d ed. C. Kluckholm & H. Murray 1953).
S. Not unlike such other cognizable and substantial liberty interests as freedom of
speech, freedom of association, and the right to vote, the "familial bond" of the parent-
child relationship is a "reciprocal right." Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647, 652
(1972). See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 535 n.7
(1973) (association); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976) (speech).
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care needs? and (2) What must such an investigation find in order to
justify the abridgement of parental autonomy by substituting the
state's judgment for that of the parents? Although both of these ques-
tions are important, this essay focuses on the second question, for it
presents the ultimate dilemma of when should the state itself become
the "parent"?
This question of primary focus arises in two quite distinct forms.
The first, on which this essay does not dwell, takes the form of gen-
erally applicable societal judgments that no parents shall have a choice,
for example, with regard to having their children vaccinated against
smallpox. Such legislative infringements of parental autonomy are
without regard to any specific individual parent's wishes. They are
perceived as a "reasonable and proper exercise of police power" in
furtherance of compelling state interests, for example, to safeguard
society generally from a smallpox epidemic.0
The second form of intrusion and the one on which this essay does
dwell, is less precisely defined. It concerns case-by-case determinations
that turn on whether the state should supervise or supervene individual
parental judgments concerning health care for their children. The
authority for state intervention is found in often vague and imprecise
neglect, abuse, and delinquency statutes, as well as in administrative
and judicial decisions that some children under certain circumstances
are entitled to obtain or to reject medical care without regard to or
against their parents' wishes. 10 In an effort to tease out some tentative
guides for fixing limits to intrusions on parental autonomy and
family privacy, a series of cases will be examined that involve (a) a
choice between life and death for "normally" formed and "mal-
formed" newborn infants; (b) a choice between life and death for a
teenager; (c) non-life-threatening choices for young children and
teenagers; and (d) two interrelated life-threatening and non-life-
threatening choices concerning a transplant from a well child to a
dying sibling.
I. Presumptions of Parental Autonomy and Family Privacy
The cases are analyzed in terms of the strong presumptions in our
legal system in favor of parental autonomy and family privacy and
against coercive state intervention. The law presumes the capacity
9. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding state compulsory vac-
cination law). Such laws may remain in force even though, with the passage of time,
they may, as in the case of vaccination against smallpox, no longer be medically sound.
10. The neglect laws are collected in S. KATZ, M. M CGRATH & R. HowE, CHILD
NEGLECT LAWS IN AMERICA (1976) [hereinafter cited as CILD NEGLECT LAWs].
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and recognizes the authority of adults to parent their children in ac-
cord with their own individual beliefs, preferences, and life styles. It
does not establish rules for child rearing to accord with some par-
ticular religious or scientific ideal. It requires only that parents meet
minimal standards of child care negatively set in neglect, abuse, and
abandonment statutes and affirmatively set in provisions such as those
obligating parents to send their children to school, to keep them out
of the labor market, and to have them vaccinated against smallpox. In
accord with fundamental notions of liberty, the law thus presumes
that parents, as adults, are qualified to decide how to meet the needs
of their children until these children themselves become adults pre-
sumed competent to decide what is in their own and their children's
interests.'1
The right to family privacy and parental autonomy, as well as the
reciprocal liberty interest of parent and child in the familial bond
between them, need no greater justification than that they comport
with each state's fundamental constitutional commitment to individual
freedom and human dignity.12 But the right of parents to raise their
children as they think best, free of coercive intervention, comports as
well with each child's biological and psychological need for unthreat-
ened and unbroken continuity of care by his parents.' 3 No other
animal is for so long a time after birth in so helpless a state that its
survival depends upon continuous nurture by an adult. Although
breaking or weakening the ties to the responsible and responsive adults
may have different consequences for children of different ages, there
is little doubt that such breaches in the familial bond will be det-
rimental to a child's well-being.' 4 But "so long as a family is intact,
11. See Goldstein, supra note 2, at 72.
12. See Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 LAw & CONTEMiP. PROB. 226, 266-67 (1975). The Supreme Court has
recognized at least two separate parent-child interests that are protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment. One is the entitlement of natural parents and their children to
each other, an interest which rests on the fact of biological reproduction and arises when
the child is born. The other protected interest is in the "familial bonds" which develop
over time between parents, whether biological or not, and the children in their long-
term care. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52 (1972). For a discussion of the impact
of a commitment to human dignity on other legal issues, see Goldstein, For Harold
Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent, and the
Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683 (1975).
13. See generally BEYoND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 4, at 9-52.
14. W. GAYLIN, CARING 25-45, 172-75 (1976); Cohen, Granger, Provence & Solnit, Mental
Health Services, in 2 IssUEs IN THE Ct-\ssIlCATIoN OF CHILDREN 88 (N. Hobbs ed. 1975);
see generally 3 A. FREUD, THE WRITINGS OF ANNA FREUD (1973).
The breaking of bonds by adolescents should not be confused with their forceful
breaking by the state:
With adolescents, the superficial observation of their behavior may convey the idea
649
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the young child feels parental authority is lodged in a unified body
which is a safe and reliable guide for later identification."'5 Court or
agency intervention without regard to or over the objection of parents
can only serve to undermine the familial bond which is vital to a
child's sense of becoming and being an adult in his own right.
Beyond these supplemental biological and psychological justifica-
tions for insulating parent-child relationships and safeguarding each
child's entitlement to a permanent place in a family of his own, there
is a further justification for a policy of minimum state intervention. It
is, as Bentham recognized, that that law does not have the capacity to
supervise the delicately complex interpersonal bonds between parent
and child. As parens patriae the state is too crude an instrument to
become an adequate substitute for parents. The legal system has
neither the resources nor the sensitivity to respond to a growing child's
ever-changing needs and demands. It does not have the capacity to deal
on an individual basis with the consequences of its decisions or to act
with the deliberate speed required by a child's sense of time and
essential to his well being. Even if the law were not so incapacitated,
there is no basis for assuming that the judgments of its decisionmakers
about a particular child's needs would be any better than (or indeed
as good as) the judgments of his parents. Only magical thinking will
permit the denial of these self-evident, but often ignored, truths about
the limits of law.'0
To recognize how vulnerable the developmental processes are be-
tween infancy and adulthood and how essential parents are for con-
tinually safeguarding children from never-ending risks is also to
recognize that parents may fail. They may place their children at
unwarranted risk rather than promote their survival to adulthood.
That danger justifies a policy of minimum state intervention rather
than one of no state intervention.
Yet recognition that parents may disserve their children's interests
still does not mean that the state necessarily can or will do better. Nor
does it justify acceptance of the vague and subjective language of
that what they desire is discontinuation of parental relationships rather than their
preservation and stability. Nevertheless, this impression is misleading in this simple
form. It is true that their revolt against any parental authority is normal develop-
mentally since it is the adolescent's way toward establishing his own independent
adult identity. But for a successful outcome it is important that the breaks and
disruptions of attachment should come exclusively from his side and not be imposed
on him by any form of abandonment or rejection on the psychological parents' part.
BEYOND THE BEST INTELESTS, supra note 4, at 34.
15. From a discussion with Anna Freud (notes on file with Yale Law Journal).
16. See BEYOND THE BEST INTEREsTs, supra note 4, at 31-34, 49-52.
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neglect and abuse statutes which give the state unguided discretion to
supervene parental decisions with regard to health care for their
children. If legislatures are to give full recognition to a child's entitle-
ment to a permanent family and the entitlement of parents, no matter
how poor, to raise their children as they think best, they must acknowl-
edge the need for a realistic reappraisal of abuse and neglect statutes-
statutes which generally, vaguely and overbroadly, provide that a child
who is being denied proper care may be found "neglected."' 7 Legisla-
tures must be made to see that the requisite of parental consent to
medical care for children becomes meaningless if refusal to consent
automatically triggers state inquiry or a finding of neglect. State
statutes then must be revised to hold in check, not release, the rescue
fantasies of those it empowers to intrude, and thus to safeguard fami-
lies from state-sponsored interruptions of ongoing family relationships
by well-intentioned people who "know" what is "best" and who wish
to impose their personal health-care preferences on others.
It is in this value-laden setting that an examination of cases is made
to determine how and to what extent the state should seek to supervise
or supervene parents in their decisions to secure or deny medical care
for their children.
II. Life-or-Death Decisions
State supervention of parental judgment would be justified to
provide any proven, nonexperimental, medical procedure when its
denial would mean death for a child who would otherwise have an
opportunity for either a life worth living or a life of relatively normal
healthy growth toward adulthood's-to majority when a person is
17. For the precise wording of the state statutes, see CHILD NEGLECT LAWS, supra note
10; Goldstein, Why Foster Care-For Whom for How Long?, 30 THE PSYCHOANALYTIC
STUDY OF THE CHILD 647 (1976).
18. While a life of relatively normal healthy growth is assumed to be a life worth
living, it is not assumed that all lives worth living from a societal-consensus point of
view could be characterized as relatively normal or healthy. For example, a quadraplegic
child, in need of a blood transfusion for reasons unrelated to that condition might, for
society, be a "life worth living" though not a life of normal healthy growth.
For an example of a decision about whether a life was worth living, see D. KEXRNS,
LYNDON JOHNSON AND THE AMERICAN DRr%. 89-90 (1976):
During the summer Sam Johnson suffered another major heart attack. He was
put in the hospital and kept in an oxygen tent for months. When Lyndon returned
to Texas on his father's sixtieth birthday, Sam pleaded with his son to take him
out of the lonely hospital and back to his home where lie could be with friends and
family. At first Lyndon resisted. The doctors said that Sam needed an oxygen tent,
and none was available in Stonewall. But Sam Johnson would not listen to logical
objections. "Lyndon," his son recalled him saying, "I'm going back to that little
house in the hills where the people know when you're sick and care when you die.
You have to help me."
Finally, Johnson agreed. "I realized," Johnson said later, "how dangerous it was
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freed of parental control and presumed competent to decide for him-
self. The state would overcome the presumption of parental autonomy
in health-care matters only if it could establish: (a) that the medical
profession is in agreement about what nonexperimental medical treat-
ment is right for the child; (b) that the expected outcome of that
treatment is what society agrees to be right for any child, a chance for
normal healthy growth toward adulthood or a life worth living; and
(c) that the expected outcome of denial of that treatment would mean
death for the child.
These criteria for intervention were met by Judge Murphy, for the
Superior Court of the District of Columbia, in In re Pogue.9 He
authorized blood transfusions for an otherwise healthy newborn infant
who would have died had his parents' decision to reject the treatment
been honored. At the same time Judge Murphy, recognizing the dis-
tinction between being an adult and being a child with regard to
medical care choices, declined to order blood transfusions for the
infant's mother who, in the face of death, refused to consent to such
intervention. Over the objection of the "adult" parents' wishes and
without regard, of course, to the infant's "wishes," Judge Murphy, as
a substitute parent, decided to protect the child's right as a person to
reach the age of majority when he will become entitled to make such
to let my father go home. But I also believed that a man had a right to live and to
die in his own way, in his own time. God knows that hospital depressed me some-
thing terrible and I was only visiting. No matter how sweet the nurses and the
doctors are, they're not your family. They don't really know anything about you,
they don't know anything about all the things that are going on in your head ....
Yes, I understood why my daddy wanted to leave and I respected his wish. I
brought him his clothes, I helped him dress, and I carried him home."
In his own room in the Johnson City house, Sam briefly seemed to improve. Then
only two weeks later, on October 23, 1937, he died.
19. In re Pogue, Wash. Post, Nov. 14, 1974, § C, at 1, col I (No. M-18-74, Super. Ct.,
D.C., Nov. 11, 1974). Judge Murphy relied upon a similar case in which a court refused
to order a blood transfusion for an adult. In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 373 (D.C. Ct. App.
1972) (84-year-old Jehovah's Witness). In a case that did not involve religious beliefs, a
Pennsylvania common pleas court refused to order surgery for a 60-year-old woman. The
court based its decision upon the woman's right to privacy. In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d
619 (C.P. 1973). But in In re President of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964), the court ordered a blood transfusion for a 25-year-old
Jehovah's Witness who was the mother of 7-month-old child. Judge Skelly Wright ex-
plained that he had ordered the transfusion because the woman wanted to live. Id. at
1009. In State ex rel. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.
1429 (1976), the court, after holding that the Holiness Church of God in Jesus Name "is a
constitutionally protected religious group," id. at 107, held that the state could prohibit,
as a nuisance, the handling of poisonous snakes. The court observed: "Yes, the state has a
right to protect a person from himself and to demand that he protect his own life." Id.
at 113. Even here, however, the court's order was influenced by its recognition of the
parental right to control the religious upbringing of children. Because of that recogni-
tion the court did not restrict its order to prohibiting snake handling in the presence of
children. Instead, snake handling was prohibited altogether.
652
HeinOnline -- 86 Yale L.J. 652 1976-1977
State Supervention of Parental Autonomy
life-or-death decisions for himself. The judge implicitly found the
infant's parents temporarily incompetent to care for the child, while
simultaneously acknowledging the adult status of the mother by de-
clining to use her refusal of blood as a basis for declaring her a danger
to herself and thus incompetent, as if a child, to decide for herself.
20
The scientific "fact" that death, for both the infant and the mother,
was inevitable without transfusion-the nonexperimental medical
procedure-was not in dispute. Nor was there any societal doubt about
the desirability-the "rightness"-of the predicted outcome of the
transfusion-an opportunity for normal, healthy growth, a life worth
living. The issue was whether the judge and doctors, as adults with an
unqualified value preference for life, could use the power of the state
to impose their "adult" judgment on adults in law whose own "adult"
judgment gave greater weight to another preference. On behalf of the
adult the answer was "No"; on behalf of the child the answer was
"Yes.' '- . Thus coercive intervention by the state was justified where
the parents' decision would have deprived a child of proven medical
treatment and consequently of an opportunity for healthy growth and
development to adulthood.
There would be no justification, however, for coercive intrusion by
the state in those life-or-death situations (a) in which there is no proven
medical procedure, or (b) in which parents are confronted with con-
flicting medical advice about which, if any, treatment procedure to
follow, or (c) in which, even if the medical experts agree about treat-
ment, there is less than a high probability that the nonexperimental
treatment will enable the child to pursue either a life worth living or
a life of relatively normal healthy growth toward adulthood. These
standards are anchored in such common law notions as that of plain
duty given expression in Justice Field's jury charge regarding criminal
liability for acts of omission:
[T]he duty omitted must be a plain duty, by which I mean that it
must be one that does not admit of any discussion as to its obliga-
tory force; one upon which different minds must agree, or will
generally agree. Where doubt exists as to what conduct should be
pursued in a particular case, and intelligent men differ as to the
20. Not all courts have acceded to the wishes of adults who refused transfusions. See,
e.g., United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965) (order dissolved once
patient recovered); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d
670 (1970) (transfusion ordered for victim of automobile accident); Collins v. Davis, 44
Misc. 2d 622, 254 N.Y.S.2d 666 (1964) (transfusion ordered for comatose patient after
wife refused consent on nonreligious grounds).
21. Cf. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168-69 (1944) (state's authority over
children broader than authority over adults).
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proper action to be had, the law does not impute guilt to anyone,
if, from omission to adopt one course instead of another, fatal
consequences follow to others.
22
Outside of a narrow central core of agreement, "a life worth living"
and "a life of relatively normal healthy growth" are highly personal
terms about which there is no societal consensus. There can thus be
no societal consensus about the "rightness" of always deciding for
"life," or of always preferring the predicted result of the recommended
treatment over the predicted result of refusing such treatment. It is
precisely in those cases in which reasonable and responsible persons
can and do disagree about whether the "life" after treatment would
be "worth living" or "normal," and thus about what is "right," that
parents must remain free of coercive state intervention in deciding
whether to consent to or reject the medical program proffered for
their child.
The high-probability-of-a-life-worth-living or of relatively-normal-
healthy-growth standard is, it must be remembered, designed not to
facilitate but to inhibit state intervention. This broad standard is
meant to reenforce a policy of minimum state intervention. In its
breadth and in its evidentiary demands it saddles the state with the
burden of overcoming the presumption of parental autonomy. In-
tervention would thus be limited to those individual life-or-death cases
in which the state could establish that the medical profession agreed
upon the rejected medical treatment and that the treatment would
provide the dying child with an opportunity for what societal con-
sensus held to be either a life worth living or a life of relatively normal
healthy growth. The state, of course, would remain without authority
to challenge parental decisions to provide medical treatment in order
to save their dying child even if the state could establish that there was
a societal consensus that the expected outcome of such treatment was
not a "life worth living."
Absent medical agreement about what treatment is indicated, or
absent a societal consensus about the rightness of the predicted result
of treatment, there would be no justification for disqualifying parents
from (or for qualifying agents of the state for) making the difficult
choice-for giving their personal meaning to "right" or to "worth
living" or to "normal healthy growth." No one has a greater right or
responsibility and no one can be presumed to be in a better position,
and thus better equipped, than a child's parents to decide what course
22. United States v. Knowles, 26 F. Cas. 800, 801 (N.D. Cal. 1864) (No. 15,540).
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to pursue if the medical experts cannot agree or, assuming their agree-
ment, if there is no general agreement in society that the outcome of
treatment is clearly preferred to the outcome of no treatment. Put
somewhat more starkly, how can parents in such situations give the
wrong answer since there is no way of knowing the right answer? In
these circumstances the law's guarantee of freedom of belief becomes
meaningful and the right to act on that belief as an autonomous parent
becomes operative within the privacy of one's family.23 Precisely be-
cause there is no objectively wrong or right answer, the burden must
be on the state to establish wrong, not on the parent to establish that
what is right for them is necessarily right for others. Indeed it is in
just such cases that the Constitution, which separates church and, to a
different degree, science from state, dictates abstention from imposing
one group's orthodoxy about health care or truth about the meaning
of life or, for that matter, death upon another.
24
Ultimately, then, it must be left to the parents to decide, for ex-
ample, whether their congenitally malformed newborn with an ascer-
23. Although the case of Karen Ann Quinlan involved a 22-year-old woman, Chief
Justice Hughes's opinion contains an apt description of the conflicting interests:
The claimed interests of the State in this case are essentially the preservation and
sanctity of human life and defense of the right of the physician to administer medical
treatment according to his best judgment. In this case the doctors say that removing
Karen from the respirator will conflict with their professional judgment. The plain-
tiff answers that Karen's present treatment serves only a maintenance function; that
the respirator cannot cure or improve her condition but at best can only prolong
her inevitable slow deterioration and death; and that the interests of the patient, as
seen by her surrogate, the guardian [Karen's father], must be evaluated by the court
as predominant, even in the face of an opinion contra by the present attending
physicians. Plaintiff's distinction is significant. The nature of Karen's care and the
realistic chances of her recovery are quite unlike those of the patients discussed in
many of the cases where treatments were ordered. In many of those cases the
medical procedure required (usually a transfusion) constituted a minimal bodily
invasion and the chances of recovery and return to functioning life were very good.
We think that the State's interest contra weakens and the individual's right to
privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims.
Ultimately there comes a point at which the individual's rights overcome the State
interest.
In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 40-41, 355 A.2d 647, 663-64 (1976).
Because of her comatose condition, however, Karen could not exercise her right to
decline treatment. "The only practical way to prevent destruction of the right," the
Chief Justice explained,
is to permit the guardian and family of Karen to render their best judgment .
as to whether she would exercise it in these circumstances. If their conclusion is in
the affirmative this decision should be accepted by a society the overwhelming
majority of whose members would, we think, in similar circumstances, exercise such
a choice in the same way for themselves or for those closest to them. It is for this
reason that we determine that Karen's right of privacy may be asserted in her behalf,
in this respect, by her guardian and family under the particular circumstances
presented by this record.
Id. at 41-42, 335 A.2d at 654.
2-4. For an initial attempt to develop this argument, see Goldstein, supra note 2, at 70.
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tainable neurologic deficiency and highly predictable mental retarda-
tion, should be provided with treatment which may avoid death, but
which offers no chance of cure-no opportunity, in terms of societal
consensus, for a life worth living or a life of relatively normal healthy
growth. Dr. Raymond Duff has argued persuasively:
Families know their values, priorities and resources better than
anyone else. Presumably they, with the doctor, can make the better
choices as a private affair. Certainly, they, more than anyone else,
must live with the consequences. Most of these families know
they cannot place that child for adoption because no one else
wants the child. If they cannot cope adequately with the child and
their other responsibilities and survive as a family, they may feel
that the death option is a forced choice .... But that is not neces-
sarily bad, and who knows of a better way.2 5
For the law to adopt the Duff position would not mean abandon-
ment of its commitment to defend human life. Special procedures
could be established within hospitals to protect infants and their
parents from possible misdiagnoses, though not from "erroneous"
moral judgment. The function of such a procedure would be to verify
the medical prognosis, not the ethical base, on which the parental
decision relied.20 If the prognosis proved to be incorrect and if the
25. Kelsey, Shall These Children Live? A Conversation With Dr. Raymond S. Duff, 72
REFL=EON, Jan. 1975, at 4, 7 (Yale Divinity School Magazine). For other expressions of
Dr. Duff's views, see Duff & Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special-Care
Nursery, 289 NEw ENGLAND J. MED. 885 (1973); Duff & Campbell, On Deciding the Care
of Severely Handicapped or Dying Persons: With Particular Reference to Infants, 57
PEDmATics 487 (1976).
26. In In re Quinlan the court proposed the establishment of a review procedure by
a hospital committee which it mislabels an "Ethics Committee":
[U]pon the concurrence of the guardian and family of Karen, should the responsible
attending physicians conclude that there is no reasonable possibility of Karen's ever
emerging from her present comatose condition to a cognitive, sapient state and that
the life-support apparatus now being administered to Karen should be discontinued,
they shall consult with the hospital "Ethics Committee" or like body of the institu-
tion in which Karen is then hospitalized. If that consultative body agrees that there
is no reasonable possibility of Karen's ever emerging from her present comatose
condition to a cognitive, sapient state, the present life-support system may be with-
drawn and said action shall be without any civil or criminal liability therefor, on
the part of any participant, whether guardian, physician, hospital or others.
70 N.J. at 54, 355 A.2d at 671 (emphasis added). Contrary to its own reasoning, which
recognized that the ethical question concerning continuance or discontinuance of the
life-support system must be left to the parents or guardian to resolve, the court con-
cluded that the attending doctors must not only provide their medical prognosis but also
determine the ethical question, that the life-support system "should be discontinued,"
before such action may be taken. Yet, consistent with its reasoning, and despite the label,
the court restricted the hospital to a review of the medical, not the ethical, decision. The
"Ethics Committee" would, as it should, only determine if the doctors were correct in
their prediction that "there is no reasonable possibility of Karen's ever emerging from her
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parents refused to accept the revised finding, the state would be em-
powered, as it was in the blood transfusion case, to order the recom-
mended treatment. If the tragic prognosis is warranted, then the law,
as Duff argues, should treat the decision as a "private affair"-whether
it be for medical means to sustain life or for humane shelter and care
not necessarily designed to avoid death.
If parental autonomy is not accorded the recognition argued for in
this essay, and if society insists through law that such children, indeed
any children, receive medical treatment rejected by their parents, the
state should provide the special financial, physical, and psychological
resources essential to making real for the child it "saves" the value it
prefers. The state should become fully responsible for making "un-
wanted" children "wanted" ones.2 7 Minimally and ideally the state
should fully finance their special-care requirements; in the event their
parents do not wish to remain responsible for them, the state should
find adopting parents who with unbroken continuity could meet not
only the child's physical needs but also his psychological requirements
for affectionate relationships and emotional and intellectual stimula-
tion.28
Except for meeting the child's physical needs the task, however large
the allocation of financial resources, may well be beyond the limits of
law. The law is too crude an instrument to nurture, as only parents
can, the delicate physical, psychological, and social tissues of a child's
life. Even if it could force, and it may not, unwilling adults to adopt
children, the law does not have the capacity to make an "unwanted"
child a "wanted" one. If the past and present provide a basis for
prediction, an institutional setting (not adoption or long-term foster
care with the same family) is the more likely but hardly satisfactory
prospect for the after "care" of such children until their majority or
present comatose condition to a cognitive, sapient state." The authority of attending
physicians and the function of review would be clarified were the hospital committee
called a "medical review" rather than an "ethics" committee.
27. For a discussion of the concept of a "wanted" child, see BEYOND THE BrST IN-
TERES, supra note 4, at 5-7. The Model Child Placement Statute proposed by the
authors states: "A wanted child is one who receives affection and nourishment on a
continuing basis from at least one adult and who feels that he or she is and continues
to be valued by those who take care of him or her." Id. at 98.
28. Parents are traditionally free, though not necessarily encouraged, to give up their
children for adoption. It is interesting that the Uniform Adoption Act of 1953 provided
in optional § 17 that adoptive parents could petition to annul if "within two years
after the adoption a child develops any serious and permanent physical or mental
malady or incapacity as a result of conditions existing prior to the adoption and of
which the adopting parents had no knowledge or notice." The Revised Uniform Adop-
tion Act (1969) has no such provision. For the text of the 1953 Act, see 9 UNIFoRi LAws
ANNOTATED 5-10 (1973).
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death. 29 Insitutional arrangements have not provided the affectionate
and other psychological ties such children-no matter how limited their
potential for healthy growth and development-demand and deserve.30
As long as the state offers institutions that provide little more than
storage space and "hay, oats, and water" 31 for medical science's achieve-
ments, the law must err on the side of its strong presumption in favor
of parental autonomy and family integrity. Thus for the state to do
other than either assume full responsibility for the treatment, care,
and nurture of such children or honor the parent's decision to consent
to or refuse authorization for treatment would be but to pay cruel and
oppressive lip service to notions of human dignity and the right to life.
The case of Karen, a teenage patient suffering from an irreversible
kidney malfunction, provides another life-or-death example in which
the standard of an opportunity for a life worth living or a life of
relatively normal healthy growth toward adulthood would preclude
state supervention of parental judgments. Karen's case poses the ques-
tion whether state intervention should be authorized to review the
choice of an adolescent who, with her parents' permission and con-
currence, decides to choose death over "life." Following an unsuccess-
ful kidney transplant, Karen and her parents refused to consent to the
continuation of "intolerable" life-support devices. The decision to
proceed as if family privacy and parental autonomy were, or at least
should be, protected was described in an article by her doctors:
[Fjollowing the transplant's failure, thrice-weekly hemodialysis
was performed. Karen tolerated dialysis poorly, routinely having
chills, nausea, vomiting, severe headaches and weakness....
... [A]fter it was clear that the kidney would never function,
Karen and her parents expressed the wish to stop medical treat-
ment and let "nature take its course." . . . [S]taff members con-
29. For a description of the conditions in one institution, New York's Willow-
brook State School for the Mentally Retarded, see Judge Judd's opinion in New York
State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 755-57 (E.D.N.Y.
1973). Referring to the "inhumane" conditions at the school, Judge Judd mentioned the
"loss of an eye, the breaking of teeth, the loss of part of an car bitten off by another
resident, and frequent bruises and scalp wounds" as typical complaints. Id. at 756.
For an effort to reverse the course of the past, see Consent Judgment in the Willow-
brook Case, No. 72 Civ. 356/357 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 1975). Similarly, see Wyatt v. Stick-
ney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), which has been described as "dealing with a
remote, rural state institution in Alabama housing some five thousand retarded children
in conditions of unrelieved horror." Burt, Developing Constitutional Rights Of, In, and
For Children, 39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 118, 138 (1975).
30. See generally S. PROVENCE & R. LIPrON, INFANTS IN INSTITUTIONS 159-66 (1962).
31. From a conversation with Judge James H. Lincoln, Judge of the Probate Court,
Juvenile Division, Wayne County, Michigan.
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veyed to the family that such wishes were unheard of and
unacceptable, and that a decision to stop treatment could never be
an alternative. The family did decide to continue dialysis, medica-
tion, and diet therapy. Karen's renal incapacity returned to pre-
transplant levels and she returned to her socially isolated life, with
diet restriction, chronic discomfort, and fatigue.
On May 10, Karen was hospitalized following ten days of high
fever. Three days later the transplant was removed. Its pathology
resembled that of the original kidneys, and the possibility of a
similar reaction forming in subsequent transplants was established.
On May 21, the arteriovenous shunt placed in Karen's arm for
hemodialysis was found to be infected, and part of the vein wall
was excised and the shunt revised. During this portion of the
hospitalization, Karen and the parents grudgingly went along with
the medical recommendations, but they continued to ponder the
possibility of stopping treatment. . . . On May 24, the shunt
clotted closed. Karen, with her parents' agreement, refused shunt
revision and any further dialysis.
Karen died on June 2, with both parents at her bedside ...
Shortly [before] her death she thanked the staff for what she knew
had been a hard time for them and she told her parents she hoped
they would be happy. We later learned that before her death she
had written a will and picked a burial spot near her home and
near her favorite horseback riding trail. In the final days she
supported her parents as they faltered in their decision; she told
her father, "Daddy, I will be happy there (in the ground) if there
is no machine and they don't work on me any more." 32
For Karen and her parents no medical treatment offered the pos-
sibility of resuming a relatively normal life or a life worth living. The
recommendation of the nursing and medical staff to continue the
life-support system was not a scientific, but a moral judgment. The
rightness of forcing the consequences of their choice upon Karen
rather than honoring her and her parents' decision could not be
established. There was then no basis for exercising the power of the
state to supervene the judgment of Karen's parents. Had Karen been
an adult, on the law's chronological scale, there is no question, or
there ought not to be, that out of respect for her dignity as a human
being, the doctors would have had to abide by her request to end the
treatment. As a New York court once declared, "[I]t is the individual
who is the subject of a medical decision who has the final say and...
this must necessarily be so in a system of government which gives the
32. Schowalter, Ferholt & Mann, The Adolescent Patient's Decision to Die, 51
PEMIATRICS 97, 97-98 (1973); a longer excerpt is quoted in J. GOLDSTEIN, A. D.RSHOWITZ &-
R. SCHWARTZ, CIMINAL LAW 166-69 (1974).
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greatest possible protection to the individual in the furtherance of his
own desires." 33
For the doctors to have proceeded with dialysis against the wishes
of teenage Karen and her parents would have constituted an assault in
tort and in crime. 34 Together as a family they must be entitled in law
to be free, as they were, of the coercive force of the state or of the
medical authorities. The law of torts and crime is designed, or ought
to be, to protect family integrity by providing such safeguards against
the supervention of parental judgment by the medical staff or other
"agents" of the state.
Had the situation been different, had Karen's parents insisted, over
her objection, on continuing the life-support system, would the state
have been justified in supervening their judgment? Or had Karen
insisted, over her parents' objection, on continuing the life-support
system would the state have been justified in supervening their judg-
ment? The answer to both questions should be "No," albeit an uneasy
"No," particularly to the second question. It is, after all, the function
and responsibility of parents to evaluate and make judgments about
the wishes and requests of their children. It is, after all, the meaning
of parental autonomy to make such decisions. Further, neither court
nor hearing agency is likely to be as competent as, for example, were
Karen's parents to determine her capacity for choice and whether to
abide by it. The law should avoid giving the discretion for such sub-
jective judgments to its agents.
But the uneasiness about the "No" answers remains. It stems from a
33. Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 28, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705, 706 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
Likewise, Chief Justice Hughes, for the New Jersey Supreme Court, in In re Quinlan,
70 N.J. 10, 38-42 355 A.2d 647, 662-64 (1976), upheld Miss Quinlan's constitutional right
as an adult to her privacy, free from state intrusion, in making such life-or-death choices.
The court, because of her incompetence, further acknowledged her father's authority, as
guardian, to exercise that right on her behalf. It observed:
We have no doubt, in these unhappy circumstances, that if Karen were herself
miraculously lucid for an interval . . . and perceptive of her irreversible condition,
she could effectively decide upon discontinuance of the life-support apparatus, even
if it meant the prospect of natural death.
* * * [N]o external compelling interest of the State could compel Karen to endure
the unendurable, only to vegetate a few measurable months with no realistic pos-
sibility of returning to any semblance of cognitive or sapient life. We perceive no
thread of logic distinguishing between such a choice on Karen's part and a similar
choice which, under the evidence in this case, could be made by a competent patient
terminally ill, riddled by cancer and suffering great pain; such a patient would not
be resuscitated or put on a respirator.
Id. at 39, 355 A.2d at 668.
34. See, e.g., Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (consent of parent
necessary before surgical procedure to graft skin from 15-year-old to his cousin); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 120 (McKinney 1975) (assault if physical injury caused); cf. F. HARPER 8- F.
JAmEs, THE LAW oF TORTS 634-35 (1956) (extent of damages recoverable by parent against
third person for tortious injury to child).
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fear that a few parents might not follow a child's express wish to
undergo treatment which might seem intolerable to them, though not
to the child. It also stems from a growing concern that for some
matters, particularly with regard to health care, the general statutory
age of adulthood, of emancipation, has been set too high. The question
then, and one addressed in the next section, is not whether Karen
specifically but whether all persons aged 16(?) in such circumstances as
Karen found herself ought to have the controlling voice in law rather
than their parents or guardians-whether it be for life or not to avoid
death. But until legislatures or courts find a formula for determining
under what circumstances and at what age below majority children
may become their own risk takers for certain health care decisions,
ultimate responsibility must remain with parents or, if they be dis-
qualified, with adult guardians, who may (as Karen's parents did) or
may not decide to support their child's choice.
III. Emancipation of Children for Health Care Purposes
The law, both case and statutory, has begun to emancipate some
minors to determine for themselves what health care course to pursue.
For example, 16-year-olds have been granted the right to enter or leave
mental institutions over the objection of parents who, in the past, had
the authority to arrange for their admission or release as voluntary
patients. 36 For another example, pregnant minors have been given
adult status for purposes of determining whether to obtain an abor-
tion.36 In the case of "mentally ill" 16-year-olds, these modifications of
parental autonomy silently rest on a not totally unwarranted suspicion
that mental institutions provide little, if any, medical treatment, and
more openly upon a fear of parental abuse, not unlike the exploitation
of the system by members of a family wishing to put a difficult spouse,
parent, or sibling out of sight. The reasons which seem to underlie
renewed challenges to the commitment of adults for mental health
care without their consent3 7 prompt and seem to justify a limited
emancipation of children in this area. As for pregnancy, the justifica-
35. See, e.g., Bartley v. Krcmens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975), prob. juris. noted,
424 U.S. 964 (1976) (class action by children under 19 in mental institutions challenging
Pennsylvania voluntary commitment statute); Melville v. Sabbatino, 30 Conn. Snpp. 320,
313 A.2d 886 (Super. Ct. 1973) (holding that parents may not continue voluntary con-
finement in psychiatric ward against wishes of 17-year-old son).
36. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 96 S. Ct. 2831, 2842-44 (1976).
37. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); J. KATZ, J. GOLDSTEIN & A.
DERsHowiTz, PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND LAv 503-632 (1967); T. SzAsz, THE MYTH
OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1961); Goldstein & Katz, Dangerousness and Mental Illness, Sone
Observations on the Decision to Release Persons Acquitted By Reason of Insanity, 70
YALE L.J. 225 (1960); Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 SCIENCE 250 (1973).
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tion for emancipation appears to stem from a recognition that those
who insist on parental consent are concerned less with the child's
well-being than with strengthening their general opposition to abor-
tion, which they cloak in the magical notion that law can improve
family communications by compelling a young woman in trouble to
consult with her parents when such family trust does not exist.38
There may, then, be situations which justify abiding by the health-
care choices of children without regard to the wishes of their parents-
situations that justify emancipating children and thus relieving their
parents of the right, as well as the responsibility, to determine whether
to consider or to accept the treatment preferences of their children.
Unlike the life-or-death problems already addressed, the issue here is
whether and when children, not the state, should be given the other-
wise parental right to determine for themselves what medical course
to pursue. The question, which could only arise in situations in which
the state would not be authorized, under the standards proposed, to
supervene parental autonomy, is: Under what specific circumstances
should the law presume children to be as competent as are adults, to
be their own risk takers for all or some health-care purposes?
Any answers to this question which favor qualifying minors, as
adults, for certain health-care decisions should provide standards for
establishing emancipation status which are as impersonal and as non-
judgmental as is the chronological-age standard for establishing adult
status.3 9 Whatever the rationale for the emancipation, access to such
status for all children in a designated category should be open and
automatic. The right to partial emancipation should not rest on
satisfying, on a case-by-case basis, some body of wise persons that the
particular child is "mature enough" to choose or that the particular
child's choice is "right.' 40 To introduce such a subjective process for
decision would be not to emancipate the child but rather to transfer
38. For the view of Planned Parenthood of New York City, see N.Y. Times, May 11,
1976, at 32, col. 2.
39. For a discussion of this point, see Goldstein, supra note 2, at 71-72; and Katz,
Schroeder & Sidman, Emancipating Our Children-Coming of Legal Age in America, 7
Far. L.Q. 211 (1973).
40. Emancipation from 1900 to the early 1960s was almost exclusively judicial and
conformed closely to the dominant societal attitudes during that period. . . The
approach to judicial emancipation was on a case by case basis, and the doctrine was
often manipulated by the courts to conform with a judge's own values rather than
with the best interests of the child.
Katz, Schroeder & Sidman, supra note 39, at 213. For a position which fails to recognize
that one of the functions of parents is to make judgments about their children's com-
petence to choose and that courts are incompetent to make such judgments, see Note,
State Intrusion into Family Affairs: Justifications and Limitations, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1383
(1974).
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to the state the parental control and responsibility for determining
when to consult and abide by the child's choice. To require relatively
objective criteria for establishing emancipation statutes is not to take
a simplistic view of children but rather to recognize how varied and
complex all children are and how inadequate courts are for assessing a
child's capacity for decision. The law then must limit the state to
determining by some relatively objective standard who is entitled to-
decide, not what specific decision is to be preferred in a particular case
nor whether a specific child has the "wisdom" to make a choice. To
resolve the question of emancipation by authorizing a court or hearing
agency to decide each case on the basis of which choice is "right" or
which child in a given category is "mature enough" is to deny to both
-parent as well as child-autonomy to decide and family privacy in
which to decide. The question thus becomes: Under what specific
circumstances should persons who are children in law and generally
responsible to and the responsibility of their parents be presumed
qualified and authorized to make medical treatment choices free of
parental control?
The requisites of an acceptable answer would be satisfied by a law
in furtherance of the strong societal commitment to safeguard "life"
which provided, for example, that children of any age (or above 12?)
are emancipated who in a life-or-death situation wish, against their
parents' decision, to pursue treatment. Although such a provision is
not being proposed it would meet the criteria set forth above only if
emancipation carried with it the right of the child to change his mind
-to agree with his parents-and to refuse or to withdraw consent for the
proffered treatment. That right would have to be recognized, not for
purposes of symmetry, but because to do otherwise would constitute a
cruel hoax on child and parent. Far better to acknowledge from the
outset in such situations that the child is not being emancipated for
health-care purposes, that the state knows what is right and that its
judgment is being imposed on both parent and child without regard
to their wishes. Legislatures or courts could more easily satisfy the
requisites of an acceptable answer by avoiding the express wishes of
the minor as a standard of emancipation and by establishing, as some
have done, such "impersonal," "objective" criteria as a chronological
age fixed below that for an adult (e.g., 16) coupled with a specific
medical diagnosis or prognosis (e.g., pregnancy, irreversible kidney
malfunction, or mental illness). Pregnancy alone, without regard to a
child's age, would be a sufficiently objective standard for emancipa-
tion to determine whether or not to obtain an abortion.
This brief consideration is not meant to provide a definitive answer
663
HeinOnline -- 86 Yale L.J. 663 1976-1977
The Yale Law Journal
to this difficult question but rather to illustrate how age and diagnoses
could and should be used as statutory criteria for the partial emancipa-
tion of children from parental authority in some health care decisions,
whether or not they involve life-or-death choices. It is to non-life-or-
death choices that this essay now turns.
IV. Non-Life-or-Death Decisions
When death is not a likely consequence of exercising a medical care
choice there is no justification for governmental intrusion on family
privacy; nor is there justification for overcoming the presumption of
either parental autonomy or the autonomy of emancipated children.
Where the question involves not a life-or-death choice but a preference
for one style of life over another, the law must restrain courts and
medicine men from coercively imposing their "kindness"-their pre-
ferred life styles-in the form of medical care upon nonconsenting
parents and their children. The law, in adopting such a position, can-
not presume that parents do not make "mistakes." Nor can it challenge
the scientific "facts," prognoses, or diagnoses upon which experts base
their recommendations. Rather the law must recognize that it cannot
find in medicine (or for that matter in any science) the ethical, polit-
ical, or social values for evaluating health-care choices. Courts must
avoid confusing a doctor's personal preference for a certain style of
living with the scientific bases upon which the recommendation rests. 41
The presumption of parental capacity to decide is meant to hold in
check judges or doctors who may be tempted to use the power of the
state to impose their personal preferences, their "adult parental" judg-
ments upon parents whose own adult judgment may give greater weight
to another preference.
In implementing this basic commitment to parental autonomy and
to family privacy, the law does not take a simplistic view of parents, of
the parent-child relationship, or of the family. Rather, it acknowledges
not only how complicated man is, but also how limited is its own
capacity for making more than gross distinctions about man's needs,
natures, and routes of development. The law recognizes and respects
the diverse range of man's religious, cultural, scientific, and ethical
beliefs and the overlapping and ever-changing modes of their expres-
sion within and between generations at all stages of the life cycle. Thus
a prime function of law is to prevent one person's truth (here about
health, normalcy, the good life) from becoming another person's
tyranny. It is in terms of that function that parental decisions in non-
41. See Goldstein, Psychoanalysis and Jurisprudence, 77 YALE L.J. 1053, 1059 (1968).
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life-or-death situations to reject medical-care recommendations for
their children will be analyzed.
The case of In re Sampson42 illustrates how vaguely worded neglect
statutes may be invoked in the name of health care to violate a family's
privacy, to undermine parental autonomy, and to foster a community's,
if not a judge's, prejudice against the physically deformed. Under the
Family Court Act of New York,4a Judge Hugh Elwyn declared Kevin
Sampson, aged 15, "a neglected child."4 4 He made this finding in order
to establish his authority to veto a decision by Kevin's mother not to
permit blood transfusions for Kevin during surgery. He ordered her
to force Kevin to undergo a series of operations which had been recom-
mended by the Commissioner of Health and by duly qualified surgeons
to correct a facial condition called neurofibromatosis. Judge Elwin
observed that Kevin had "a massive deformity of the right side of his
face and neck. The outward manifestation of the disease is a large
fold or flap of an overgrowth of facial tissue which causes the whole
cheek, the comer of his mouth and right ear to drop down giving him
an appearance which can only be described as grotesque and repul-
sive. ' 40 He went on to psychologize and predict:
[T]he massive deformity of the entire right side of his face and
neck is patently so gross and so disfiguring that it must inevitably
exert a most negative effect upon his personality development, his
opportunity for education and later employment and upon every
phase of his relationship with his peers and others.40
Judge Elwyn made this assertion with apodictic certainty even though
he acknowledged that "the staff psychiatrist of the County Mental
Health Center reports that 'there is no evidence of any thinking dis-
order' and that 'in spite of marked facial disfigurement he failed to
show any outstanding personality aberration.' ,,47 Nevertheless, the
judge added, "this finding hardly justifies a conclusion that he has
been or will continue to be wholly unaffected by his misfortune." 4
He also noted that Kevin had been exempted from school, not because
he was intellectually incapable, but, it may be assumed, because he
42. 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Fam. Ct. 1970), aff'd, 377 App. Div. 2d 668, 323
N.Y.S.2d 253 (1971), aff'd, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972).
43. N.Y. F1.. CT. ACr §§ 1011-1074 (McKinney 1975).
44. 65 Misc. 2d at 676, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 658.
45. Id. at 659, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
46. Id. at 660, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 644.
47. Id., 317 N.Y.S.2d at 644.
48. Id., 317 N.Y.S.2d at 644. According to Judge Elwyn, a psychologist had found
Kevin to be extremely dependent. The staff psychiatrist reported that Kevin demonstrated
"'inferiority feeling and low self concept.'" Id., 317 N.Y.S.2d at 644.
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appeared to his classmates and teachers as he did to Judge Elwyn him-
self, "grotesque and repulsive." But the judge's speculations on behalf
of the state as parens patriae did not lead him to consider that under
the protective cloak of family privacy, a loving, caring, accepting,
autonomous parent had somehow been able to nurture in Kevin a
"healthy personality." Kevin, after all, had developed in spite of state-
reenforced prejudice and discrimination against the physically different
in school, health agency, and court.
The testimony of the doctors who recommended surgery justified
not a finding of neglect but rather a reaffirmation of parental au-
tonomy. The doctors admitted that "the disease poses no immediate
threat to [Kevin's] life nor has it as yet seriously affected his general
health" and that surgery was very risky and offered no cure. 49 Further,
the doctors found in the central nervous system no brain or spinal cord
involvement and that delay until Kevin was 21, would decrease, not
increase, the risk. The court replied with blind arrogance:
[T]o postpone the surgery merely to allow the boy to become of
age so that he may make the decision himself as suggested by the
surgeon and urged by both counsel for the mother and the Law
Guardian... totally ignores the developmental and psychological
factors stemming from his deformity which the Court deems to be
of the utmost importance in any consideration of the boy's future
welfare and begs the whole question.50
And without regard to the relationship of Kevin's well-being to the
integrity and support of his family, the court added: " 'Neither by
statute nor decision is the child's consent necessary or material, and
we should not permit his refusal to agree, his failure to cooperate, to
ruin his life and any chance for a normal, happy existence.' "51
The judge, who by an act of conjury had qualified himself as
prophet, psychological expert, risk taker, and all-knowing parent, de-
scribed but ignored a powerful reason for concluding that state
authority should not supervene parental judgments about the rightness
49. Id. at 661, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 644.
50. Id. at 672, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
51. Id. at 673, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 656 (quoting In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 87, 127 N.E.2d
820, 824 (1955) (Fuld, J., dissenting)). For a contrary view of the importance of a child's
preference regarding surgery, see In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972). Ricky
Green was a 15-year-old boy who, as the result of polio, had a 940 curvature of the
spine. Doctors proposed a spinal fusion to straighten the spine, but Ricky's mother
refused her consent for blood transfusions during the operation. Saying that the
"ultimate question" concerned Ricky's wishes, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court remanded
the case for a determination of Ricky's wishes. Id. at 350, 292 A.2d at 392. After talking
with Ricky, the court found that he did not want the operation; his wishes were
honored. Green Appeal, 452 Pa. 373, 307 A.2d 279 (1973).
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for their child of a recommended medical treatment when death is not
in issue. Judge Elwyn wrote:
It is conceded that "there are important considerations both
ways" and that the views expressed by the dissenting Judges in
Seiferth have not been universally accepted. Moreover, it must
also be humbly acknowledged that under the circumstances of
this case "one cannot be certain of being right." Nevertheless, a
decision must be made, and so, after much deliberation, I am
persuaded that if this court is to meet its responsibilities to this
boy it can neither shift the responsibility for the ultimate decision
onto his shoulders nor can it permit his mother's religious beliefs
to stand in the way of attaining through corrective surgery what-
ever chance he may have for a normal, happy existence, which, to
paraphrase Judge Fuld [author of the dissent in Seiferth], is dif-
ficult of attainment under the most propitious circumstances, but
will unquestionably be impossible if the disfigurement is not
corrected.
5 2
Were his humility real, the judge would not have allowed himself
to believe that he, rather than Kevin's mother, was best qualified to
determine the meanings of "a normal and happy existence" for her
son. In Kevin's eyes either might be proven "wrong" retrospectively.
But nothing, not even magic, can qualify a judge to make that predic-
tion with equal or greater accuracy than the parent. Nor is any judge
prepared, let alone obligated, as are parents, personally to assume day-
to-day responsibility for giving the Kevins the care they may require
as a consequence of such a personal value choice about life style.
Laws of neglect must be revised to restore parental autonomy and
safeguard family privacy not only because judges cannot be substitute
parents and courts cannot be substitute families but also because the
power of the state must not be employed to reenforce prejudice and
discrimination against those who are cosmetically or otherwise dif-
ferent. When Judge Elwyn referred to Judge Fuld's dissent, it was to
a case in which the court refused to find Martin Seiferth, aged 14, a
neglected child even though his father would not compel Martin to
undergo the surgery recommended for the repair of a cleft palate and
harelip. 3 Martin's father, despite his own beliefs, would have con-
sented to the surgery had Martin been willing. Their decisions were
based not upon "religious" beliefs, but upon a belief that "forces in the
universe" would allow Martin to cure himself. Despite evidence far
less equivocal than that in Kevin's case, the majority of the court re-
fused to be trapped by rescue fantasies of the health department and
52. 65 Misc. 2d at 674, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 657.
53. In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955).
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its doctors or by strong prejudices which the court was being asked to
reenforce in an effort to "save" the child from himself and his parents.
The court refused to order surgery, not because it thought it lacked
authority, but because it thought Martin's reluctance to have the
surgery foretold an unwillingness to participate in the therapy follow-
ing the operations. Thus it was unwilling, unlike Judges Elwyn and
Fuld, to substitute its or a state agency's value preferences about life
style and about who and what is beautiful or natural for those of the
responsible parents.
If Martin Seiferth, as an adult, chose to undergo the recommended
surgery, it would not invalidate the argument that the court should
not even have had discretion to do other than to protect him and his
parents frori state intrusion. In fact, Martin Seiferth chose not to
have the surgery. "After attending one of the vocational high schools
in the city, where he learned the trade of upholsterer and was elected
president of the Student Council, he set up in business on his own and
is, despite his disfigurement, active and successful. ' ' 4 The county
health department that originated the case reacted as if experience
offered no lessons about the need for minimum state intervention on
parental autonomy and family privacy:
"[He] had graduated . . . at the head of [his high school] class. It
was his intention then to become an interior decorator. ... [T]he
Health Department [is] still of the opinion that the operation
should have been performed in order to give this young man a
fuller opportunity for the development of his talents."
The law must be designed to protect its citizens from just such official
blindness to the forceful imposition of personal wishes or beliefs on
those who share neither the wish nor the belief about the value of
medical care or "fuller opportunities" for their children.
V. Interrelated Decisions Not Involving Life or Death for One Child
and Involving Life or Death for Another Child
Should the state have authority to invade the privacy of a family in
order to review the deliberations of parents who have to decide whether
to let one of their children die or whether to attempt to supply a life-
saving organ for transplant by consenting to "unnecessary" surgery on
one of their healthy children?
The answer ought to be "No." But that was not the answer of a
54. Letter from Mr. William G. Conable, attorney for Seiferth, to Joseph Goldstein
(Apr. 20, 1964), quoted in J. GOLDSTEIN & J. KATZ, supra note 5, at 993.
55. Letter from Mr. Elmer R. Weil, county attorney of Eric County, to Joseph Gold-
stein (Apr. 28, 1964), quoted in id. at 993-94.
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Connecticut court in Hart v. Brown.50 In that case doctors advised Mr.
and Mrs. Hart that the only real prospect of saving their eight-year-old
daughter Katheleen's life from a deadly kidney malfunction was to
transplant a kidney from Margaret, her healthy twin sister. The
doctors recommended and the Hart parents consented to the "un-
necessary" surgery on Margaret to provide Katheleen with an oppor-
tunity to pursue a relatively normal life. But the hospital administra-
tion and the doctors refused to accept parental consent without a court
review.57 They acted out of a concern for their livelihood, not for the
lives or well-being of Margaret or of Katheleen. Understandably, they
feared becoming liable for money damages because the law might not
accept parental consent as a defense to assault and malpractice, were
such suits brought.
The Harts were thus forced to turn to the state to establish either
their authority to decide or the rightness of their decision. They in-
itiated a declaratory judgment action. There followed hearings and
proceedings before Judge Robert Testo which intruded massively on
the privacy of the family and set a dangerous precedent for state in-
terference with parental autonomy. There was no probable cause to
suspect that the parents might be exploiting either of their children,
only that the doctors and administrators in refusing to accept the
parental choice might be risking the well-being of both children and
the family. The court upheld the parental choice, though not their
autonomy to decide.
Although Judge Testo's decision avoided tragic consequences for the
Harts, he did set a precedent for unwarranted and undesirable inter-
vention by the state. He held:
To prohibit the natural parents and the guardians ad litem of the
minor children the right to give their consent under these cir-
cumstances, where there is supervision by this court and other
persons in examining their judgment, would be most unjust, in-
equitable and injudicious. Therefore, natural parents of a minor
should have the right to give their consent to an isograft kidney
transplantation procedure when their motivation and reasoning
are favorably reviewed by a community representation which in-
cludes a court of equity.58
56. 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (1972).
57. Interestingly, the doctors were willing to rely on parental consent, without court
review, to remove both of Katheleen's kidneys and thus leave her with "no potential
kidney function" and with the "prospect of survival . . . because of her age, at best
questionable." Id. at 372, 289 A.2d at 388. Cf. In re Nemser, 51 Misc. 2d 616, 621-25, 273
N.Y.S.2d 624, 629-32 (1966) (petition for appointment of guardian to amputate foot of
80-year-old woman; judge's complaint about resort to court).
58. 29 Conn. Snpp. at 378, 289 A.2d at 391 (emphasis added). For another view of
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Had the Hart parents refused to consent to Margaret's surgery and
the transplant of her kidney to Katheleen, equally unwarranted pro-
ceedings might have been brought to establish their neglect in order
to obtain court authority to impose the doctors' recommendation.
Doctors can, because of their special training, make diagnoses and
prognoses; doctors can indicate the probable consequences for a
Margaret or a Katheleen of pursuing one course or another. But
absent a societal consensus, nothing in their training, or for that
matter in the training of judges, qualifies them to impose upon others
their preferred value choices about what the good or better is for such
children or for their families. The critical fallacy is to assume as Judge
Testo does in his declaratory judgment-as the legislature does in its
laws of neglect and abuse-that the training and offices of doctors,
legislators, and judges endow them not just with the authority but
also with the capacity to determine what risks to take for someone
else's child, in circumstances where there is no right or wrong answer
or set of answers.
That some will object to and be uneasy about the substantial limits
this essay proposes be placed upon the power of the state to supervene
parental decisions about health care for their children cannot be
denied. But it is the absence of a substantial societal consensus about
the legitimacy of state intrusion on parental autonomy, on the entitle-
ment of children to autonomous parents, and on family privacy in
situations beyond the proposed limits which is the best evidence for
holding in check the use of state power to impose highly personal
values on those who do not share them. Further, the limits set by the
standard of normal healthy growth toward adulthood or a life worth
living, by the life-or-death choice and by the requirement of proven
medical procedures has a built-in flexibility which can respond both
to new findings in medicine and to new and changing consensuses in
society.
the issues presented by such cases, see Lewis, Kidney Donation by a 7-Year-Old Identical
Twin Child: Psychological, Legal, and Ethical Considerations, 13 J. CHILD PSYCH. 221-43
(1974). But see In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185 (La. App.), cert. denied, 284 So. 2d 338
(La. 1973) (affirming lower court's refusal to approve of kidney transplant from mentally
retarded 17-year-old to his 32-year-old sister); see also Howard v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp.
Auth., Cir. No. 3-90430 (Super. Ct., Fulton County, Ga., Nov. 29, 1973) (finding invalid
mother's consent to transplant from her 15-year-old, moderately retarded daughter, since
mother would be recipient of kidney). The court in Howard, however, authorized the
transplant under a doctrine of "substituted judgment." The case, along with others that
pose similar issues, is discussed in Nolan, Anatomical Transplants Between Family Menz-
bers-The Problems Facing Court and Counsel, [1975] FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4035.
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